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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CASE NO. 20070286-CA

vs.
CINDY WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from her conviction on one count of Possession of a Controlled
Substance within 1,000 feet of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in violation of
Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(d) and False Personal Information in violation of Utah Code
Ann.§ 76-8-507(1). The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Code Ann, § 77-13-6 (2007)
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in
1

abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection
(2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and
Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e)
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e) (4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; (B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that
the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable,
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement,
and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
2

withdraw the plea; and .
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the
defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the
defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement
has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into
or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Defendant was charged with one count of Possession of a Controlled
Substance within 1,000 feet of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in violation of
Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(d) and False Personal Information in violation of Utah Code
Ann.§ 76-8-507(1). (R. 01-2). On November 16, 2006, the Defendant, who was
represented by counsel, entered into a plea agreement with the State, in which she agreed
to plead guilty as charged, in exchange the State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. (R.
57/2-5). On that date, the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin went through a Rule 11 colloquy
with her and the Defendant signed a formal plea agreement which also covered Rule 11
subject matter. IdSentencing was set for December 21,2006. Defendant failed to appear, although
she asked her attorney to file a motion to withdraw her plea at that time. Her basis for her
motion was that the "police report" was full of lies. (R. 029). She also claimed that Adult
Probation and Parole should not be allowed to make recommendations because they are
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part of the State. Id. Her motion was filed on December 27, 2006 with the court, but she
did not appear for sentencing until March 15, 2007. On that date, her motion to withdraw
her plea was denied and she was sentenced to one year and ninety days in jails to run
concurrent with each other. (R. 56/3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the
Defendant's motion to withdraw her plea. Her motion was based on two grounds;
however, her focus in her appeal is based on her allegation that she did not understand
that when the State agreed to remain silent that only meant the prosecutor and that Adult
Probation and Parole was not bound by the same terms of the agreement. Apparently, the
Defendant argues her "misunderstanding" is a basis to withdraw her plea because it was
not done voluntarily and knowingly because of her "misunderstanding" of the plea deal.
On November 16, 2007, the Court went through a Rule 11 colloquy with the
Defendant and the Defendant signed a plea agreement which included a section that
spelled out the plea bargain, including specific language stating that the plea bargain is
between "myself and the prosecuting attorney." (Addendum B; R. 57/20). Further, the
agreement had a section entitled "Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness." Id. In this
section the Defendant agreed that she was "entering this plea of [her] own free will and
choice." Id. Based on the colloquy and the plea agreement, the Court accepted the plea,
finding that Rule 11 requirements had been met, including that she understood the plea
4

agreement and was voluntarily entering into the agreement. (Addenda A and B).
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY PLEA.
A plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing

that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." U.C.A. § 77-13-6(a) (2006). A
"withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right... [and] is within the sound
discretion of the trial court." State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987).
Additionally, "a plea's presumption of validity is strong, and one who would set a plea
aside has the burden of proving that there is a legal ground for doing so." State v.
Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(internal citations omitted). As
stated earlier, a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea should not be disturbed,
"unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion." State v. Thorup. 841
P.2d 746, 747-748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(internal citations omitted).
Under Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a Court may not accept
a guilty plea until it has found that the Defendant understood "the rights they surrender by
pleading guilty and who voluntarily waive those known rights" as laid out in that Rule.
State v. Beckstead. 140 P.3d 1288,1290 (Utah 2006)(internal citations omitted). Rule 11
allows those findings to be "based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the
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defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah
R. Crim. P. Rule 11(e). Trial courts are granted "substantial discretion to employ
methods tailored to determine whether a specific guilty plea is knowing and voluntary."
Beckstead. 140 P.3d at 1291.
A. Defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly made.
The Defendant claims that because the trial court failed to explain to her that the
term "State" did not include Adult Probation and Parole, her plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made. Defendant's conclusion fails to acknowledge the plea agreement in this
case, which explicitly states that the plea bargain is between "herself and the prosecuting
attorney." (Addendum B; R. 57/20). Judge Baldwin specifically asked the Defendant
about the plea agreement and asked her if she thoroughly understood the agreement.
(Addendum A at 3). She responded that she did. Id. Further, after accepting her plea,
the trial court referred the matter to AP&P for a presentence report. Id. at 4. Some time
was spent in court trying to set up the meeting between Adult Probation and Parole and
the Defendant. Id. at 4-5.
Using the abuse-of-discretion standard of review in this case, the court's denial of
the Defendant's motion to withdraw her plea was not clearly erroneous. Further, the trial
properly followed the procedures used in Rule 11 and had a sufficient basis to conclude
that the Defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.
B. State v. Thurston is on point in this case.
6

Defendant claims that State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), is not
controlling in this case. Defendant claims that the real issue in Thurston was whether the
State breached its agreement when AP&P made sentencing recommendations to the trial
court, not whether Defendant's plea was voluntarily made. Defendant's reading of
Thurston is far too narrow.
While one of the issues in Thurston was whether all state agencies were bound to a
prosecutor's plea bargain, another issue in Thurston dealt directly with whether the
Defendant's plea was involuntarily because of "an exaggerated belief in the benefits of
his plea" because of his misplaced reliance on the State's recommendation, which was
supplemented by AP&P's conflicting recommendation. Id. at 1301. The Utah Court of
Appeals went through the same factors that the State went through above and found that
the Defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly made even though the trial court in
that case did not specifically tell the Defendant of AP&P's possible role in the case. Id.
The Court found that the Defendant's knowledge that the judge was not bound by any
recommendation meant that "he could not have reasonably held an exaggerated belief in
the benefits of his plea." Id. at 1302. The issue in Thurston and the present case was the
same-whether AP&P's recommendation meant that Defendant's plea was unknowing
and involuntary. This Court should follow Thurston and find that AP&P's
recommendation did not invalidate Defendant's plea, particularly in the present case
where the plea agreement specifically points out that the agreement is between "[the
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Defendant] and the prosecuting attorney." (Addendum B; R. 57/20).
C. Defendant misconstrues the "liberally granted" language in State v.
Gallegos.
The Defendant has cited language from Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1041-1042, which
stated that:
The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of several important constitutional
rights, including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to
trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses. Because the entry of such a plea
constitutes such a waiver, and because the prosecution will generally be unable to
show that it will suffer any significant prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be liberally
granted.
The Court of Appeals has clarified what the Court meant, when it found that "[T]his
liberal-approach language, however, is directed to the trial court's exercise of discretion.
The language in no way alters the statutory requirement of good cause for the withdrawal
of a guilty plea nor our abuse-of-discretion standard of review." State v. Thorup, 841
P.2d 746, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The jurisdictional requirement is further heightened since U.C.A. § 77-13-6(a)
(2006) was amended in 2003. The current statute states that a plea of guilty "may be
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made." U.C.A. § 77-13-6(a) (2006). This is different from the pre-2003
version, which gave the court broad discretion in withdrawing a guilty plea for "good
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cause shown.11 Id. (2002).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the appellee asks this Court to affirm the trial court's
denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea to one count of Possession of a
Controlled Substance within 1,000 feet of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(d) and False Personal Information in violation of
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-507(1). (R. 01-2).
DATED this ^ 0

day of January, 2008.

Teral L. Tree
Attorney for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

day of January, 2008,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S.

Mail, postage prepaid, faxed or hand-delivered two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF
APPELLEE to Dee Smith, 2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite. 200, Ogden, Utah 84401.
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EXHIBIT A

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT
vs .
CASE NO. 061904033
CINDY WILLIAMS,
Defendant.

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
NOVEMBER 16, 2006
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN

•k -k -k ~k -k

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE STATE:

MR. MARK R. DECARIA

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

MR. MICHAEL BOUWHUIS

COPY
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

1

P R 0 C E E D I N G S
THE CLERK:

2
3

Stare of Utah versus Cindy Williams,

061904033.

4

THE COURT:

M s . Will iams is present.

5

time set for pretrial.

6

MR. BOUWHUIS:

This is the

Your Honor, the State has agreed to

7

be si lent in sentencing in ex change for her plea to the count

8

A

9

zone and class C misdemeanor of false information.

— or the class A possession of marijuana in a drug-free

THE COURT:

10

Ms . Will iams, you understand what's

beincf represented to me?

11
12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:
anything

14

You don' t have to plead guilty to

Do you understand that?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

I understand that.

The:re' s a statement in advance of plea.

Have you had a chance to review that in detail, what your

17
18

Yes, I do, Your Honor.

1

constitutional rights are?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. DECARIA:

22

MR. BOUWHUIS:

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

Thank you.

25

THE CLERK:

Your Honor, we actually need a new date

Yes, I have.

And have you signed that?
Have you signed that?
I -- yes.
Yes, I did sign it.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

of birth on this defendant.

She was actually booked in under

false information, and the last time we were in court we
amended the name to Cindy Williams, but nobody was aware of
the date of birth.
THE DEFENDANT:

7/5/57.

THE CLERK:

7/5 of ! 57.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Is that your signature on

this document?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

This acknowledges to me that you

understand thoroughly what your rights are.

Is that a fair

statement?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Let's just review that for a minute.

You have a right to plead not guilty and have a trial.
trial could be before a judge or a jury.

A

At the trial you 1 11

have a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
called against you, wouldnft have to testify against
yourself, and if convicted would have a right to an appeal.
If you plead guilty, you give up that right.

Do you

understand that?THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor, I do.

To the charge possession of a controlled

substance, marijuana, class A misdemeanor, are you guilty or
not guilty?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I'm guilty, Your Honor.

And to the charge of a false

information, are you guilty or not guilty?
4

J

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

6

presentence report.

7

I

We'll refer this and get a

21st of December.

21st of December.

I'll see you back

J here then, ma'am.

10

MR. BOUWHUIS:

11
12

Thank you.

PROBATION OFFICER:
THE COURT:

9

Guilty.

Your Honor, she did want me to ask

the Court, too, to consider allowing her release pending
I sentencing.

She's got a number of health problems herself,

13

and her mother just had back surgery, and she is the only

14

person there to take care of her, and she would like to be

15

I able to be home to take care of her, perhaps after APP talks

16 J to her.
17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

the bail.

19
20

I was out on bail, but they revoked

THE COURT:
J

Yes, I know.

THE DEFENDANT:

And I went in front of Judge Lyons

21

( s i c ) , two days ago, and he released me on everything.

22

then the judge said —

23

or the jail said I had to come in

I front of you.

24
25

But

THE CLERK:
I that was

She actually had a new felony charge

—

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE CLERK:

Dismissed.

She —

3

stricken.

4

will be by summons, but —

5

well, it wasn't dismissed, it was

They didn't file the felony.

THE COURT:

If they do file, it

and then the bond.

Okay.

If —

once the probation officer

6

has talked to you, they have the authority to release you

7

until we have sentencing.

8

PROBATION OFFICER:

9

Your Honor, because she's from

Tooele, they'll refer this down to Salt Lake.

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

PROBATION OFFICER:

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

PROBATION OFFICER:

14

No, I'm from Salt Lake.
Oh, are you?

Yes, sir.
Well, either way it's going to

go to Salt Lake.

15

THE COURT:

Going to go to Salt Lake.

16

THE CLERK:

Even if she's in our jail?

17

PROBATION OFFICER:

18

THE CLERK:

19

PROBATION OFFICER:

20

Huh?

Even if she's in our jail?
Well, I guess that's true.

she's in our jail, we'll do the report.

21

J

22

J her once you have the information.

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

PROBATION OFFICER:

24

THE COURT:

25

If

J

Okay.

You have the authority to release

Okay.
Ms. Williams, that's all.

(End of proceedings.)

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER )
I, DIANE W. FLANAGAN, RPR, Official Court Reporter
in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
foregoing is a true and correct transcription from the
videotape recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a
relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or
financially interested directly or indirectly in this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
seal of office at Ogden, Utah, this 4th day of April, 2007.

Co

3J*~+*.

Diane W. Flanagan
a
Official Court Reporter

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395,1056

EXHIBIT B

SECOND DiSTSlCT COURT

2m NOV 16 PH3; 2 5
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.,
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2562 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone (801) 392-8247
Fax (801) 334-7275
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

O 0 H O V O 3 3

On/y Lolllkam*Judge

Defendant.

f?*//!ssfb

_, hereby acknowledge and certify that I
I,.
have been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights;
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES

I am pleading guilty (or no contest)tothe following crimes:
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

<4 r^AJ/J

A.

DEGREE

^M

PUNISHMENT
MIN/MAX AND/OR

/^/jz**>

B.
J3~*&*

,yrtJtf^^#Zt<ft^

s***^

y?<f/

Jr V<22L

C.

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it
readtome, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crimes)towhich I am pleading
guilty (or no contest).
.
e—.
iand<

061904033

WrUJAMS,CINDY

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) please and
prove the elements of the crime(s) to whjph I am pleading guilty (or no contest):

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no
contest) I will give up all the following rights:
COUNSEL: I know that I have therightto be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that
I might later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
Iffiavejiet) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived myrightto counsel, I
have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reason:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived myrightto counsel, my attorney is ^Z//4U/J^/^/yf?q/Y
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
JURY TRIAL. I know that I have a rigjht to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up thatrightby pleading guilty (or no contest).
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

I know that if I were to

have a jury trial, (a) I would have therightto see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and (b) by attorney, or myself if I waived myrightto an attorney, would have the opportunity
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
would pay those costs.
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. I know that if I
were to have a jury trial, I would have therightto testify on my own behalf I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF.

I know that if I do not plead

guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crimes). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element
of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If die trial is before a jury, the verdict must be
unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crimes) stated above.
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I
would have dierightto appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).

I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.

CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA
POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.

I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement
CONSECTJTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS. I know that if there is more that one
crime involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime
that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of whidbi I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or
no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are not) the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:

TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not binding
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge
may do are not binding on the Judge.
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.

I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I amfreeto change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am y ^ years of age. I have attended school through the ) y Grade. I can read and
understand the English Language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medications, or intoxicants which impair my judgement
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I amfreeof any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent mefromunderstanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I mustfilea
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) prior to sentencing. 1 will be allowed to withdraw my plea
only if I show good cause. Once, I am sentenced, I loose myrightto withdraw my plea.
DATED this
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for
^ the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her, I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents
and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crimes) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's
criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and
declarations made my the defendant in the forgoing affidavi^fc accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FORE

BARNO.
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
_, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find
that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true
and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered
defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the offense(s) for
which the plea(s) is /are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest

<°CHK/
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
BARNO.
ofrg^
ORDER

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the
signatures andfindsthat defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily made.
It is hereby ordered that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crimes) set
forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
DATED this

